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IN THE SUPRP.ME COUR!' 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELENE SHAW, doing business as ) 
Al\'1'HUR k1IRRAY DANCE ) 
sru.nro, ) 
Plaintiff and Bespondent, ) 
) Case No. 7741 
_vs._ ) 
) 
ARA M. DIMOim JEPPSON, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Please correct page one ( l) by changing the 
word "Plaintiff' s•• to "Defendant • s '' in the third 
line ao that the first sentence of the second para-
graph will read: 
"The facts as set forth in Defendant 1 s brief 
consist principallJ of quotations from the contract 
between Plaintiff' and Defendant.n 
Another Utah case dealing with what constitutes 
doing business is MARCHAilT v. NATIONAL :RESERVE l;0Ml?ANI 
OF AMERICA, 103 Utah 530, 137 P. 2nd 331 ~ The cast\ 
holds that, where a forei6l). corporation -takes four 
deeds to uteh property and has them. recorded, it is 
still not doing business under the statute requiring 
a foreign corporation to qualify. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELENE SHAW, doing business as 
ARTHUR :JIURRA Y DANCE 
STUDIO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ARA ~L DIMOND JEPPSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 77 41 
In accordance with the Appellant's brief the parties 
herein will be referred to as Pl~efendant 
The facts as set forth in -~- rief consist 
principally of quotations from the contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. It is incomplete and does not 
state all the facts necessary to decide the questions 
raised. We will therefore make a more complete state-
ment, which facts we believe are substantially undis-
puted. 
Arthur Murray Incorporated is a foreign corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in New York 
City (Answer of Defendant, Record page 6). Plaintiff 
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has a contract with that corporation (Exhibit 2) wherein 
she is licensed to use the "Arthur Murray Method" and 
the Arthur Murray name in connection with a dancing 
school. This license agreement consists of four pages of 
fine print. It is impractical to set forth even the sub-
stance of the entire contract in this brief but we will 
mention such portions as we believe are significant so 
far as they lend support to the theory of either Plaintiff 
or Defendant. 
The Licensee is "Helene Druke Shaw," Plaintiff here-
in. It recites that Plaintiff "is desirous of personally 
conducting a dancing school in Salt Lake City" and of 
using the "Arthur Murray Method" and the name of 
"Arthur ].{urray." The Licensee is required to register 
or file statements "of his use of such name in the proper 
office of any county in which such dancing school or 
studio or any branch thereof may be located and in any 
other governmental office where it is mandatory or 
permissive that such a statement be filed ... " (Para-
graph 1, Exhibit 2) Licensee agrees to pay 10% of gross 
receipts to the Licensor. The license agreement has 
many provisions intended to assist the Licensee in main-
taining Arthur Murray standards and that require the 
Licensee to keep the studio on a basis that is uniform in 
quality with Arthur Murray standards. Some of these 
requirements are set forth on pages 9-13 of Defendant's 
brief. The Defendant's statement as to these require-
ments is substantially correct with the following qualifi-
cations: 
In paragraph 4 of the contract referred to on page 
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10 of Defendanfs brief, while Licensee agrees to follow 
certain standards and policies, the failure to follow them 
gives the Licensor only the right to terminate the con-
tract. On page 11 Defendant states that Licensor has 
"the right to hire or fire any or all employees of the Salt 
Lake studios". This is definitely a misstatement. No 
right to hire is contained in said paragraph or anywhere 
in the contract. Paragraph 7 does provide that any per-
son hired (by Licensee) and found objectionable "shall 
be disruissed forthwith at the request of the Licensor." 
Licensor ruay not fire but rnay only request that some 
objectionable person shall be disn1issed. Undoubtedly 
in any such case the contract would be so construed that 
the Licensor could not act arbitrarily. Nevertheless the 
only right given Licensor on failure to maintain stand-
ards is the right to terminate the agreement. Paragraph 
7 specifically says that teachers are to be paid by the 
Licensee. There is no evidence that the Licensor ever 
did anything pertaining to the dismissal of any employ-
ees and in fact it never did. The remaining statements 
in Defendant's brief pertaining to the contract so far 
as it goes are substantially correct except that she uses 
the word "must" where the contract provides "shall." 
The Licensee is solely responsible for all expenses 
of the dancing school (paragraph 10, Exhibit 2). The 
Licensor while requiring the Licensee to live up to certain 
requirements and standards has only the· right in case 
of such failure on the part of the Licensee to terminate 
the agreement on certain notice. (See paragraph 16, 20 
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and 22 of Exhibit 2 in addition to paragraph 7 above 
mentioned.) 
The contract may be analyzed as a license to use the 
name and methods of Arthur Murray in the conduct of 
a dancing school for which the Licensee pays a 10% 
royalty of gross receipts. There is an additional5% paid 
to the Licensor which is placed in a trust fund to secure 
the performance by the Licensee in the giving of un-
finished lessons contracted for at other studios. There 
are conditions imposed on the Licensee in the use of 
the name and methods of Arthur Murray, breach of which 
gives the right to terminate. The net profit in the oper-
ation of the studio belongs entirely to the Licensee and 
the Licensee is solely responsible for all losses (Record 
33). The payment of the 10% of gross receipts to the 
Licensor is in no way conditioned upon whether or not 
the Licensee makes a profit and the Licensor, therefore, 
has no interest in profits or losses, taking a straight 
royalty on gross receipts. 
Arthur Murray and no representative of Arthur 
Murray Inc., has ever visited plaintiff's studio (Record 
68-69). Defendant does not contend that the making 
of this contract constituted doing business in the State 
of Utah by the Licensor, but the contract was necessarily 
signed outside of the State of Utah, Arthur Murray who 
signs for the corporation never having been within the 
State. The following is the undisputed testimony as to 
the manner in which the business is conducted. 
Plaintiff testified that-"I am the employer." (Re-
cord 15) Arthur Murray advises Licensee to have own 
liT 
'j 
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lawyer look at all contracts (Record -!2). Licensee can 
purchase instruction books or not as she wishes (Record 
-!~). Licensee sends duplicate time slips to New York 
along with a weekly report (Record 56). This report 
shows only the lessons taught and the gross receipts 
(Record 51). It does not show wages paid or expenses 
(Record 51 and 67). The facilities at the studio, which 
consist of a desk, files, telephone, ballroo1n and phono-
graph records, are all owned by the Licensee (Record 
60 and 67). No representative of Arthur l\1urray, Inc. 
has ever visited Salt Lake City (Record 68-69). Plain-
tiff testified-'· ... :Mr. :iliurray regards us as individual 
owners of our studio and anything that comes up, we ar~ 
not required to do it. We are not part of the corpora-
tion of Arthur Murray, et al." (Record 32) Plaintiff 
filed "Affidavit of Doing Business Under an Assumed 
Name" (Exhibit F'). This exhibit shows that "Helene 
Druke Shaw" is the owner and the business is done 
"under the name of ARTHUR MURRAY STUDIOS 
(not incorporated)". Plaintiff registered the "ARTHUR 
MURRAY STl-:-DIO" in the office of the Secretary of 
State (Exhibit G). This Exhibit states: 
"Helene Druke Shaw, a franchise holder of 
the Arthur Murray Studio, registered with this 
office the trade name 'Arthur Murray Studio.'" 
On October 12, 1949, plaintiff under the name of 
"Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
hereinafter referred to as the 'Employer' " entered into 
a contract with the defendant (who was then Ara M. 
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Dimond and who later became Mrs. Jeppson) (Exhibit 
A). Paragraphs 5 to 11 of this agreement are set forth 
in plaintiff's brief at pages 4 to 7. The contract shows 
distinctly that Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake 
City is separate and distinct from Arthur Murray, Inc. 
It recites that-"The employer conducts an Arthur Mur-
ray dancing school." It then refers to "Arthur Murray, 
Inc." and its predecessors, which have expended and 
will continue to expend large sums of money to develop 
methods of teaching and dancing. The contract thus 
clearly distinguishes between the employer and Arthur 
Murray, Inc. 
In paragraph 6 of the agreement Arthur Murray, 
Inc. is further distinguished from the employer by the 
statement that-"The employer may photograph the 
employee, and the employer and Arthur Murray, Inc. 
may forever use his or her name ... ",etc. The contract is 
signed "Arthur l\iurray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, by Helene Druke Shaw, Employer." 
We thus see that the defendant was not misled as 
to whether she was employed by Helene Druke Shaw 
doing business as Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, or by Arthur Murray, Inc., a New York 
corporation. She claims no misrepresentation to her as 
to who was her employer and relies on nothing but the 
form of the license agreement in her claim that Arthur 
Murray, Inc. was in fact her employer and is in fact the 
plaintiff in this case. 
Since defendant relies solely on the defense that 
the plaintiff is in fact Arthur Murray, Inc., a foreign cor-
~ i 
d 
mQI 
II, 
:.1 
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poration doing business in Salt Lake City, other evidence 
is perhaps not now particularly n1aterial. Nevertheless, 
a brief statement of other facts is helpful in giving a 
more complete picture of this case. Plaintiff testified 
that teachers such as the defendant are given a full 
training course of three to four months of four hours per 
day prior to the tin1e the employee commences teaching. 
One hour a day of instruction is continued thereafter 
(Record 16). Plaintiff attends conventions of the Arthur 
:Murray system periodically in order to keep up on the 
latest methods and dances. These conventions may be 
in any city of the United States (Record 16). These 
trips are all at the cost of the plaintiff (Record 17). 
Plaintiff has ten or twelve manuals published by Arthur 
Murray which cost from $25 to $200 each, one such 
manual costing $400 (Record 18). All the material in 
these books and the knowledge acquired by plaintiff by 
fifteen years' experience is given the teachers (Record 
19). This experience includes methods of approach and 
teaching as well as actual dance training (Record 20). 
Defendant after being so employed quit after ap-
proximately one and a half years' employme~t without 
stating any reason (Record 20). It will be noted that the 
contract restricts the defendant from teaching dancing 
only for a period of two years and within a twenty-five 
mile radius of the Arthur Murray Dancing Studio. No 
claim is made that the restriction is not a reasonable 
and lawful one and necessary to protect the good will 
of plaintiff's business. It is undisputed that defendant 
was trained as a dancing teacher entirely by plaintiff; 
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that she has had access to all of the records and files 
of plaintiff showing names, telephone numbers and ad-
dresses of all students; that plaintiff has spent large 
sums of money to secure these students and train de-
fendant. Defendant if permitted to break the contract 
could advertise as an Arthur Murray teacher, contact 
all students fonnerly with plaintiff and give them les-
sons at a much cheaper rate than plaintiff (Record 21 
and 26). It was shown that prior to the institution of 
the Arthur Murray method there was only instruction 
on a commercial basis of the waltz and fox trot; that 
Arthur Murray has spent a great deal of money in re-
search to develop South American dances, and that now 
one hundred twenty steps are taught; that this is unique 
in the history of dancing in the United States (Record 
23). Plaintiff, therefore, has a great deal of good will 
to protect in the enforcement of this contract. 
The trial court entered a decree enjoining defend-
ant from teaching dancing, etc., as provided in the con-
tract. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. This suit is by plaintiff in her own name and 
in her own right on a contract made exclusively between 
plaintiff and defendant. 
2. Arthur Murray, Inc., a foreign corporation, is 
not a party to this action and, therefore, no question 
arises with regard to the right of a foreign corporation 
to sue in the State of Utah. 
3. Assuming (without admitting) that doing aH of 
:ll 
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the things provided for 1n the license agreement by 
Arthur :Murray, Inc., a foreign corporation, would con-
stitute doing business in the State of Utah, the 1nere 
provision for such activity is insufficient to constitute 
doing business, and the question must be determined by 
what has actually been done by the foreign corporation. 
4. There is nothing to support the claim that 
Arthur Murray, Inc. is doing business in the State of 
Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THIS SUIT IS BY PLAINTIFF IN HER OWN NAME 
AND IN HER OWN RIGHT ON A CONTRACT MADE EX-
CLUSIVELY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
The action herein involved is based solely on a writ-
ten contract (Exhibit 1). The question of whether or not 
plaintiff sues in her own right or sues to enforce this 
contract in the right of Arthur Murray, Inc. should be 
determined by the provisions of the agreement. There 
is no contention that there is any matter agreed to be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant except as contained 
in the written contract. As pointed out in the statement 
of facts, the "employer" is "Arthur Murray Dance Studio 
of Salt Lake City, Utah." Arthur Murray, Inc. is ex-
pressly referred to in the contract as a third party and 
not as a party to the contract. All of the things to be 
done by the defendant are to be done for the employer, 
Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Everything which is to be done as consideration for 
the promises of the defendant is to be done by the Arthur 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, Utah. Such 
e1nployer is responsible for the payment for the services 
rendered. In each instance it is the "employer" who 
obligates herself to the employee. Is it possible under 
this contract that the defendant could sue Arthur 1\fur-
ray, Inc. in the event of the failure of the employer to 
pay her wages~ Certainly not. Arthur Murray, Inc. in 
no way enters into the contract as the principal. In 
whatever way Arthur Murray, Inc. may be a third party 
beneficiary, it is not as a party to this contract, either as 
disclosed or undisclosed principal. The fundamental 
relationship of any agency between Arthur Murray, Inc. 
and the plaintiff is missing in this contract and in this 
action. 
In Volume 1, page 7, of the "Restatement of the 
Law of Agency" it is stated: 
"(1) Agency is the relationship which re-
sults from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his 
behalf and subject to his control, and consent 
by the other so to act. 
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken 
is the principaL 
(3) The one who is to act is the agent." 
Agency is again defined in 2 Am. J ur. 13, Section 
2, as follows: 
"An agency may be defined as a contract 
either express or implied upon a consideration, 
or a gratuitous undertaking, by which one of the 
parties confides to the other the management vf 
some business to be transacted in his name or 
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on his account, and by which that other assumes 
to do the business and render an account of it. 
This is con1parable with the definition of agency 
as adopted by the American Law Institute." 
The case of PFRKELL Ys. CITY OF FLORENCE, 
175 SO. 417 giYes the following staten1ent defining 
agency: 
.. r nder the rules, as laid down by all of the 
authorities, the distinguishing features of agency 
are its representative character and its derivative 
authority. \Yhether a particular relationship is 
an agency depends on the relations of the parties 
as they in fact exist, without regard to what they 
call their relationship. (citing cases) Before there 
can be an agent, there must be a principal, and, 
'lrhen a person acts independently, he cannot be 
classed as an agent for any purpose." 
Agency is further defined in the case of COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY CLUB vs. HIGGINS, 23 F·ED. SUPP. 
572 at page 57 4 as follows : 
"While innumerable definitions and interpre-
tations of the term 'agency' may be found in the 
law reports and law digests, I think that the 
statement found in the case of S.. B. McMaster, 
Inc., v. Chevrolet Motor Co., D. C., 3 F. 2d 469, 
474, is sufficiently clear to merit quotation. It is 
there stated in part: 'Without undertaking to 
review in detail all the various definitions that 
have been made of the term, I think it may be 
safely asserted that they all recognize two dis-
tinctly essential elements. The first is that the 
agent is a representative and acts, not for him-
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self, but for another. The second is that his acts 
within the scope of his authority must be binding 
upon his principal.' " 
The contract between plaintiff and defendant is 
simply one of employment of the defendant by the plain-
tiff. There is no possibility from any facts in this case 
which would make it possible for the plaintiff to have 
hired the defendant as an employee of Arthur Murray, 
Inc. Even if it were possible, it was not in fact done, 
the contract being unrelated to Arthur M:urray, Inc. 
No question of a foreign corporation doing business in 
the State of Utah is presented. 
2. ARTHUR MURRAY, INC., A FOREIGN CORPORA-
TION, IS NOT A PARTY TO THIS ACTION AND, THERE-
FORE, NO QUESTION ARISES WITH REGARD TO THE 
RIGHT OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO SUE IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
This point is closely related to the first. Arthur 
Murray, Inc. of New York is seeking nothing, has not 
come into Court, and defendant has no reason to claim 
that it is a party in any way. Arthur Murray, Inc., 
either directly or indirectly, is asking nothing from 
this or the trial court. What has been said with regard 
to point No. 1 and the authorities in support thereof 
sustain point No. 2. 
3. ASSUMING (WITHOUT ADMITTING) THAT DOING 
ALL OF THE THINGS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LICENSE 
AGREEMENT BY ARTHUR MURRAY, INC., A FOREIGN 
CORPORATION, WOULD CONSTITUTE DOING BUSINESS 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH, THE MERE PROVISION FOR 
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SUCH ACTIVITY IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE 
DOING BUSINESS, AND THE QUESTION MUST BE DE-
TERMINED BY WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DONE BY 
THE FOREIGN CORPORATION. 
The only possible support which defendant has for 
her contention that Arthur :Murray, Inc. is doing busi-
ness in the State of Utah is the license agreement be-
tween such corporation and the plaintiff (Exhibit 2). 
Assuming for the moment that if Arthur :Murray, Inc. 
exercised its prerogatives that it would then be doing 
business in the State of Utah, it does not follow that 
it is doing business simply because it entered into the 
license agreement. It has never had any representative 
in the State of Utah. At least until it does some of 
the things provided for in the contract (which defend-
ant claims would be doing business), no business is 
transacted within the State. This is supported by the 
case of UNITED STATES vs. AMERICAN BELL 
TELEPHONE CO~fP ANY AND OTHERS, 29 FED. 
17. The question in that case was whether or not a 
certain license agreement between a foreign corporation 
and a local telephone company constituted doing busi-
ness. There were provisions similar to the license agree-
ment in question. The Court held that it did not create 
the relationship of agency. The Court then further held 
that whether or not the foreign corporation is carrying 
on business in the State must be determined by what 
it has done or is doing and not the powers reserved 
in existing contracts, which powers have not yet been 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
exercised. The Court's holding is well stated in Syllabus 
9 as follows : 
"Whether a foreign corporation is carrying 
on business in a state must be determined by 
what it has done, or is doing, rather than by 
what it may hereafter do, under powers reserved 
to it in existing contracts, but not yet exercised. 
For one person to supply the means to another 
to do business with or on is not the doing of 
that business by the former." 
This case is approved and the ruling clearly stated 
1n LAVARRE vs. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COM-
PANY, 37 FED. 2d 141 at page 146. The Court said: 
"The facts in the case above cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court are illustrative 
of the strictness with which that court regards 
service of process upon corporate defendants. 
The action there was against the American Bell 
Telephone Company, a Massachusetts corpora-
tion, and was brought in Ohio. Service was had 
upon the Cleveland Telephone Company, in which 
the Bell Company owned stock, and it was alleged 
to be an operating agency of the Bell Company 
in Ohio. The facts alleged in regard to the inter-
corporate relation are stated by the court in an 
analysis of the bill of complaint. In a long and 
well-considered opinion, Judge Jackson held that 
such facts were not sufficient to make the Bell 
Company present and doing business in Ohio 
because of its relation with the local corporation. 
In conclusion the court said (29 F. page 46): 
'The various matters relied on to show that the 
American Bell Telephone Company is to be found · 1 
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in Ohio, and subject to the jurisdiction of this 
court,- such as its ownership of the telephone 
instruments used by the licensee corporations; 
the ownership of stock in one or more of the local 
companies; the rights and powers reserved to it 
of resuming possession of its telephone instru-
ments, and taking control of the telephone busi-
ness, in the event of default on the· part of the 
licensee corporations in complying with the pro-
visions of the license contracts; the sharing in 
the gross receipts of certain portions of the 
business done; the reservation of rents and royal-
ties; the right to make changes ; and the restric-
tions and limitations imposed upon the licensee 
companies, -neither singly nor in the aggregate 
establish the two essential facts necessary to 
bring the American Bell Telephone Company 
within the power and jurisdiction of this court, 
viz., that said corporation is now, or was at the 
commencement of this suit, carrying on its busi-
ness in the State of Ohio, and that it had a 
"managing agent" or agents representing it 
here.'" 
4. THERE IS NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM 
THAT ARTHUR MURRAY, INC. IS DOING BUSINESS IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The previous three points and authorities cited 
should, we think, clearly dispose of this case. How-
ever, there are cases in which admittedly the foreign 
corporation was involved as a party in the litigation 
but, under license agreements similar to the one involved 
herein, it was held that the foreign corporation was not 
doing business within statutes requiring foreign cor-
porations to qualify. 
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A leading case on this subject is 1fcMASTER vs. 
CHEVROLET MOTOR COMPANY, 3 FED. 2d 469. 
The question in this case was whether service of process 
on a "dealer" was good service on defendant, a foreign 
corporation. The question presented is stated as follows: 
"I will now consider the defendant's motion 
to set aside the service and dismiss the case. 
While the motion is based both upon the ground 
that the defendant is not doing business in the 
state and that the person upon whom service 
was made is not defendant's agent, nevertheless 
the two grounds may be considered together, for 
under the facts in the case, if the defendant is 
doing business at all in this state, it is by virtue 
of the agency created by the contract referred 
to, and if, per contra, the contract does not cre-
ate the relation of agency, the defendant is not 
doing business in the state. In other words, there 
is no proof or claim before this court that the 
defendant is doing business in the state save 
through the acts of the Barrow-Chevrolet Com-
pany, under the terms of the contract between 
that company and the defendant. It is true that 
the plaintiff does claim that when the defendant 
exercises the right under the contract to come 
into the state and inspect the Barrow-Chevrolet's 
place of business, records, accounts, etc., such 
acts themselves constitute doing business in the 
state. But I do not think that such acts alone 
would constitute doing business in the state in 
the sense that the defendant would be liable to 
process in such state. Therefore, as I view it, a 
decision upon the question of agency will dispose 
of both grounds of the motion." (Page 471) 
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The Court held that the agreement did not create 
an agency so as to constitute the Chevrolet Motor Com-
pany doing business in the state. The ruling of the 
court and the essential facts are contained in the follow-
ing state1nent: 
"Without undertaking to review in detail all 
the various definitions that have been made of 
the term, I think it may safely be asserted that 
they all recognize two distinctly essential ele-
Inents. The first is that the agent is a representa-
tive and acts, not for himself, but for another. 
The second is that his acts within the scope of 
his authority must be binding upon his principal. 
In the contract in question one may search in 
vain for anything showing that whatever the 
person termed the 'dealer' is to do under the 
contract, he is acting for the person termed the 
'seller'. All of the acts of the dealer are for his 
own account. His purchases are made for him-
self. His maintenance of an office, station, serv-
ice rendered, sales of cars, advertising, and all 
of the other various features in the contract 
upon which plaintiff relies as establishing an 
agency, are acts which the dealer performs, not 
as the act of the seller nor for the seller, but 
as his own act and for himself. We may also 
search in vain in the contract for any authority 
whatever for the dealer to bind the seller. What-
ever may be required of that contract of the 
dealer, whatever he does under that contract, 
the liability and responsibility are his, so far as 
other persons are concerned, and not the liability 
or responsibility of the seller. To make assur-
ance doubly sure, the parties have expressly 
declared that he shall have no such authority. 
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It is clear to my mind that no third party could 
hold the seller liable for any act of the dealer 
performed under that contract." (Page 474) 
In the case of STATE vs. FORD :MOTOR COJ\1-
PANY, 38 S.E. 242, the State of Carolina attempted to 
require the defendant to comply with the State law 
relating to foreign corporations which were doing busi-
ness in the State. The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina had previously held that the defendant, Ford Motor 
Company, could be served with process in the State 
when the summons was served on C. E. McCallister, an 
employee of the defendant while "servicing its dealers". 
It had not held that the "dealer" or any of its employ-
ees could be served with process as agents for the de-
fendant. The Court made a distinction between doing 
business in the State for the service of process on an 
actual employee in the State on business of the foreign 
corporation and doing business within the statute re-
quiring that the foreign corporation file its articles and 
pay fees and expenses. This case held that the Ford 
Motor Company was not doing business in the State 
for such purpose. The State in its claim relied upon 
the contract between the defendant and local dealers. 
For the form of the dealer's contract the Court referred 
to and incorporated the case of THOMPSON vs. FORD 
MOTOR COMPANY, 21 S.E. 34 (see second column page 
244 of 38 S.E. 2d). The dealer's contract is analyzed 
at pages 37 to 39 of 21 S.E. We quote a portion of that 
opinion. The Court said: 
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"It is provided that 'title to aH Company 
products, except in a case where the invoice 
shows sale to be on credit, shall be and remain 
with Company until actual receipt of the full 
purchase price in cash by Company.' With refer-
ence to checks and other negotiable paper from 
the dealer, the agreement provides: 'Until Com-
pany has received cash in full payment of any 
such check, draft or other commercial paper, its 
right to retake and resell Company products 
for which such paper is issued shall continue.' 
It is provided that the prices of all Company 
products shall be subject to change from time 
to time, that the dealer agrees to maintain a 
place of business 'and only one place of business' 
(subject to one or two exceptions) and that such 
place of business shall be 'located in a place and 
equipped in a manner acceptable to Company; 
to display conspicuously thereon approved F·ord 
signs; to install and maintain therein the tools, 
machinery and equipment recommended by Com-
pany; to employ sufficient, competent salesmen 
to solicit adequately all potential purchasers of 
Company products in the community in which 
Dealer is located, and sufficient service mechanics 
to render prompt, efficient service to owners of 
Company products and to render such service to 
any owners of Company products engaging such 
service.' It further provides that the dealer is 
'to install and maintain an accounting system 
in accordance with Ford Dealers Accounting Pro-
cedure Manual as approved by Company; to fur-
nish Company at regular intervals as designated 
by Company accurate financial statements reflect-
ing the true financial condition of dealer's busi-
ness on standard forms provided by Company 
for that purpose; to allow representatives of 
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Company, at all reasonable times and from time 
to time, to examine all records, contracts and 
accounts covering sales or service of Company 
products by Dealer and to examine Dealer's 
stock and place of business and to test Dealer's 
equipment and facilities' and 'to submit promptly 
to Company, Dealer's Ten Day Reports accurate-
ly and fully prepared on forms provided by 
Company therefor and on the dates specified 
therein. 
* * * * * * 
"Then follow certain restrictions upon the 
dealer with reference to sales made beyond his 
territory. In certain instances the Company acts 
as umpire between dealers, but does not guar-
antee the results. Then follow certain restric-
tions as to the sale of parts for Ford automobiles 
and trucks, except 'genuine Ford' parts. The 
dealer agrees not to use sales policies or adver-
tising matter in any manner in connection with 
his business as a Ford Dealer which are detri-
mental to the Company or to other F·ord dealers, 
or to which the Company may object as being 
detrimental to its good will. 
* * * * * * 
"The contract contains many other provisions 
retaining and strengthening the vast control 
which respondent had the right to exercise over 
the conduct and affairs of D. W. Gavin & Co., 
Inc., but enough examples have been given herein 
to illustrate the authority which respondent exer-
cised over this 'dealer'." 
On these facts the Court held that the Ford Motor 
Company was not doing intrastate business within the 
statute requiring such foreign corporations to qualify. 
The Court said : 
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"Appellant's business in South Carolina is 
interstate in character, according to the evidence, 
and it cannot be required to domesticate or suffer 
the statutory penalty for failure thereabout. In-
fliction of the latter would burden interstate com-
n1erce, which the state cannot constitutionally 
do. Appellant's many dealers in the state are 
not its agents; they are in intrastate business 
here, not it. And its traveling representatives 
are here on occasions 'servicing' its warranties, 
cultivating the interstate business, supervising 
it and soliciting more, but they make no local 
sales or collections nor engage otherwise in intra-
state business so far as the record before us 
shows. The activities of the itinerant representa-
tives are incidental to the interstate business but 
they undoubtedly manifest the presence here of 
the corporation for jurisdictional purposes." (38 
S.E. 254) 
See also the cases of STREET AND SMITH PUB-
LICATIONS vs. SPIKES, 120 FED. 2d 895; WATSON 
FIREPROOF WINDOW COMPANY vs. E. A. RYS-
DON, 189 ILL. APP. 134 (affirmed 190 Ill. App. 316); 
PAULINE OIL AND GAS COMPANY vs. MUTUAL 
TANK LINE (OKLA. 1926), 246 PAC. 851. 
Defendant at the trial placed much emphasis on the 
fact that plaintiff advertised in the telephone directory 
and listed herself as "Helene Druke, Director" of Arthur 
:Murray Studios. This has no significance whatever so 
far as we can see but it has been held that even though 
Arthur :Murray, Inc. had listed its name in the directory 
it is not evidence of doing business. See the case of 
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GABRIEL GARLEN vs. BANCAMERICA-BLAIR 
CORPORATION, 205 MINN. 275, 285 N.W. 723. 
Perhaps there has been no previous Utah case with 
facts particularly similar to this case. We call attention, 
however, to the case of BROWNING vs. STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, 107 UTAH 457, 154 PACIFIC 2d 993. 
The question in this case was what portion of the Brown-
ing Company business should be allocated to the State 
of Utah for franchise tax purposes. The question was 
what was the "business done" within the State. It was 
claimed by the corporation that rentals collected from 
property outside of the State of Utah was not business 
done within the State. The test applied by the Court 
was whether or not the collection of the rent on property 
in another state would constitute doing business in that 
state. If not, then it was business done in the State of 
Utah where the main office was located. As to this 
test the Court said: 
"Where a corporation is conducting an in- -I 
vestment business in Utah and also in other 
states, the income derived from its entire invest-
ment business must be allocated in the manner 
prescribed by subsections (1) and (3) of Section 
80-13-21. Rents, interest and dividends derived 
from 'business done' by the taxpayer without the 
State of Utah should not be allocated to Utah. 
Rents, interest and dividends derived from 'busi-
ness done' by the taxpayer within the State of 
Utah. should be allocated to Utah." (Page 464) 
The Court held that the collection of rent on prop-
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erty in another State was not doing business in that 
State and it was, therefore, business done in Utah where 
the home office was located. The Court said: 
.. If upon certain conduct it would be held 
that a corporation was doing business in Utah 
so as to subject it to the corporate franchise tax, 
the same conduct in another state would consti-
tute doing business in said other state and income 
derived therefrom would not be allocated to Utah. 
The test as to whether a corporation is doing 
business in states other than Utah under par-
ticular fact situations would therefore be: Would 
such conduct if carried on in Utah be held to 
constitute doing business so as to subject the 
corporation to the Utah corporate franchise tax." 
This Utah court held that the business done was in 
Utah. Arthur Murray, Inc. has its office in New York. 
Certainly the collection of royalties from a gross income 
of a business in Utah is no more doing business than 
the owning, managing and collecting of rent on property 
in another state. 
ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT'S CASES 
INTERNATIONAL TEXT BOOK COMPANY vs. 
PIGG, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. ed. 678. Plaintiff, a corpora-
tion of Pennsylvania, was selling correspondence school 
courses in Kansas. Sale was made through an agent. 
(The agency was not disputed.) The agent had an office 
in Kansa~. worked on a salary plus commission, signed 
contracts with the purchasers, accepted a partial pay-
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ment and forwarded the contract and the money to the 
office of the plaintiff in Pennsylvania. The pertinent 
facts are set forth in the following part of the opinion: 
"During the period covered by the present 
transaction, the company had a solicitor-collector 
for the territory that included Topeka, Kansas, 
and he solicited students to take correspondence 
courses in the plaintiff's schools. His office in 
Kansas was procured and maintained at his own 
expense, for the purpose of furthering the pro-
curing of applications for scholarships and the 
collection of fees therefor. The company had no 
office of its own in that state. The solicitor-col-
lector was paid a fixed salary by the company 
and a commission on the number of applications 
obtained and the collections made. He sent daily 
reports to the company for his territory, those 
reports showing that for March, 1906, the aggre-
gate collections on scholarships and deferred 
payments on subscriptions approached $500. 
"At the date of the agreement sued on, and 
and at the time this suit was brought, numerous 
persons in Topeka were taking the plaintiff's 
course of instruction by correspondence through 
the mails. The contracts for those courses were 
procured by its solicitor-collector assigned to 
duty in Kansas, and, as stated, payments thereon 
were collected and remitted by him to the plain-
tiff at Scranton." (Pages 682-683) 
Even on these facts the case is only dictum so far 
as doing business in the State is concerned as the plain-
tiff was permitted to recover because of the unconsti-
tutionality of the statute. However, we do not question 
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the reasoning of the Supre1ne Court. The plaintiff was 
admittedly represented by an agent who Inade contracts 
in the State of Kansas in the name of and for the benefit 
of the foreign corporation. :Money was collected on the 
contracts, which undoubtedly constituted doing busi-
ness. There is no similarity upon the facts with the 
case before the Court. 
FOX vs. L~\ VENDER, 89 UTAH 115, 56 PAC. 
~d 1049. The question in this case was whether the 
driver of a car was the agent of defendant. In deter-
mining that question the Court said there were the fol-
lowing pertinent facts: 
"The five ingredients of the problem before 
us to be taken into consideration to determine 
whether the wife had control of the husband 
(as driver of the car) during the trip to Bingham 
are: (1) The relationship of husband and wife; 
( 2) the fact that they were on an errand to get 
a dress for the wife; (3) the joint ownership of 
the car; ( 4) the fact that the wife and husband 
agreed that the husband should drive; and ( 5) 
four occupants of the car were on a trip to call 
on the mother." (Pages 119-120) 
There is nothing in this case at all helpful on the 
question of agency. 
GOLDEN vs. AMERICAN KEENE CEMENT 
CO:JIP ANY, 98 UTAH 23, 95 PAC. 2d 755. Property 
consisting of a cement and plaster mill owned by the 
defendant, American Keene Cement and Plaster Com-
pany, had been legally owned by John Bowditch, Jr., 
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who at the time of taking title in his name was Yice 
President and General Manager of California Stucco 
Products Company, a foreign corporation not qualified 
to do business in Utah. During such ownership by John 
Bowditch, Jr. the property was operated under the name 
of National Keene Cement Company, which was unin-
corporated and which we may assume was a trade name 
for the true owner. Later when Bowditch left the em-
ployment of the California Stucco Company the property 
was at that time conveyed to Thomas W. Golden, plain-
tiff herein, who was an employee of California Stucco 
Products Company. While legal title was in the name 
of Golden, a contract of sale was made by and in the 
name of California Stucco Products Company to the 
predecessor of defendant, Edward E. Jones Investment 
Company. It was recited in this contract that the Cali-
fornia Stucco Products Company had an interest in the 
property. The sale provided for a note and mortgage 
which was later given by the defendant, American Keene 
Cement and Plaster Company, at the time transfer was 
made to it. Payments on this note and mortgage had 
been made to the California Stucco Products Company. 
On attempted foreclosure by Golden, in whose name 
the note and mortgage had been given, defendant claim-
ed that California Stucco Products Company was the 
real owner and plaintiff and that it was not entitled to 
sue, being a foreign corporation having done business 
in the State and not qualified in accordance with our 
statute. The trial court had held for the plaintiff on 
this point. Certain evidence had been excluded. In 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
reversing the case for a new trial the Supreme Court 
suggested that there was strong evidence that Golden 
was really acting for and on behalf of the California 
Stucco Products Company. The Supreme Court said: 
··As a matter of fact, it is rather hard to 
believe that Golden was other than an alter ego 
of the California Corporation. It is true that 
the evidence offered to prove that he was an em-
ployee of the corporation was properly ruled out, 
but when one considers how his name first came 
into the picture through the agreement; how all 
the transactions were carried through by officers 
and directors of the California Corporation; the 
significance of changes in title to the property 
as the personnel of the corporation changes, and 
as companies change; that interest payments 
were made to that corporation; and how Golden 
has been so conspicuously absent, even to the 
extent of failing to appear in the case by depo-
sition attacking any of this evidence-when one 
considers these facts, there is more than a sus-
picion in one's mind that all is not as it should 
be." (Page 32) 
There was nothing in the case to show that Golden 
personally had any beneficial interest in the property 
or the business conducted or in the note and mortgage 
that was sued on in his name; whereas, in the case 
before this Court the plaintiff has full beneficial interest 
as well as legal title to all property involved including 
furniture, fixtures, lease, accounts receivable and the 
contract herein sued upon. Arthur l\Iurray, Inc. has only 
a contractual right to 10% of the gross income with 
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a right to terminate upon failure to pay or to comply 
with other conditions. 
Another question in the Golden case was whether at 
the time the property was opera ted under the National 
Keene Cement Company name the business was not in 
fact carried on by or for the benefit of California Stucco 
Products Company. Letters had been offered in evidence 
showing that the California Stucco Products Company 
included in its income tax return the result of the busi-
ness of National Keene Cement Company. Payments on 
the mortgage had in fact been made to California Stucco 
Products Company; the sale of the property had been 
in its name, the contract reciting that it had an interest. 
These and other facts which might appear in the new 
trial were suggested by the Supreme Court as evidence 
that the California Stucco Products Company was in 
fact doing business in the State. The Supreme Court, 
however, made no final conclusion. It suggested that 
one of the chief questions was who was interested as 
owner of the National Keene Cement Company. We 
submit that the facts of this case have no similarity to 
the case before this court. 
FRANKLIN BUILDING AND LOAN COMPANY 
vs. PEPPARD, 97 UTAH 483, 93 PAC. 2d 925. We do 
not dispute the holding of this case as stated by the 
defendant at page 18 of her brief that a foreign cor-
poration actually doing business in the State cannot 
foreclose a mortgage unless qualified as a foreign cor-
poration. The same may be said of the cases of DUNN 
vs. UTAH SERUM COMPANY, 65 UTAH 527, 238 
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PAC. 245, and FIRST NATIONAL BANK vs. PAR-
KER, 57 UTAH 290, 194 PAC. 661, these cases being 
cited on page 19 of plaintiff's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
\Ve submit that there is no evidence that Arthur 
~Iurray, Inc., a foreign corporation, is or has been doing 
business in the State of Utah. The signing of the license 
agreement did not constitute doing business because 
this would be insufficient under the adjudicated cases, 
and it was not signed in the State of Utah. Arthur 
.Murray, Inc. has never exercised any of its prerogatives 
under the license agreement, which are at most only 
conditions under which the plaintiff can continue the 
use of the name and methods of Arthur Murray. It is 
clear from the evidence and facts in this case that plain-
tiff made a contract in her own right; that Arthur 
Murray, Inc. was not a party to the contract and that 
this suit is solely in the name of and for the benefit of 
the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & 
CANNON and ROBERT M. 
YEATES, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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